NGA: Boosting Innovative GEOINT - Research (NGA BIG-R BAA)

Due Date: Jul 31, 2023 05:00 pm EDT Government Organization: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Description: The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) posted Topic 6 of the BIG-R BAA: Detecting Known Trajectory Manipulations. Abstracts are due by 5:00 p.m. Eastern on April 25. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Office of Research is looking for a capability that can recognize suspected GPS-derived geo-coordinate manipulations in large sets of spatio-temporal trajectory data.

Category: Opportunity

DoD Communities Of Interest: Big Data

Subject: NGA: Boosting Innovative GEOINT - Research (NGA BIG-R BAA)

Due Date: Jul 31, 2023 05:00 pm EDT

Government Organization: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)

Description:

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) posted Topic 6 of the BIG-R BAA: Detecting Known Trajectory Manipulations. Abstracts are due by 5:00 p.m. Eastern on April 25.

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Office of Research is looking for a capability that can recognize suspected GPS-derived geo-coordinate manipulations in large sets of spatio-temporal trajectory data.

The mission of DKTM is to bring to NGA technology capable of:

  • Processing large, geo-coordinate data sets having time and identifier metadata
  • Inferring spatial trajectories from the geo-coordinate data sets aggregated by identifier
  • Automating the process of finding trajectory manipulations
  • Reporting to a user the discovery of the manipulations found in the data

Background

Over twenty years ago in a report published by the National Transportation Safety Council it was theorized that it would be possible to intentionally misdirect a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver using only a few synthesized Radio Frequency (RF) signals created to mimic actual Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) GPS signals. It was suggested that the purpose of the hypothetical mimic would be to corrupt the capacity of any targeted GPS receiver to produce accurate geo-coordinate information. In 2008, in the United States, one American academic researcher demonstrated that a digital signal processing device connected to a suitable RF transmitter could indeed force a standard GPS receiver to produce false (or spoofed) geocoordinate output.

Website: https://sam.gov/opp/104fd2671946454dbaf72e7a00da5852/view

Questions or assistance, contact:
North Carolina Defense Technology Transition Office (DEFTECH)

 

Dennis Lewis
lewisd@ncmbc.us
703-217-3127

Bob Burton
burtonr@ncmbc.us
910-824-9609

North Carolina Defense Technology Transition Office | PO Box 1748, Fayetteville, NC 28303